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ABSTRACT
The after-effects of the 9/11 attacks continue to reverberate around
the world. It is much too soon to draw any definitive conclusions
about its long-term impact, let alone its place in history. But five
years is long enough to ask some preliminary questions and suggest
some tentative answers. This article addresses only two of the many
possible questions. First, did 9/11 represent a “Revolution in
Terrorism Affairs”? That is, did it amount to such a profound break
with the past practice of terrorism that the world now confronts an
unprecedented threat? Second, did it “alter the course of history”?
Did it initiate any significant events or have consequences which
otherwise would not have occurred?
The development of terrorism over the last three decades calls
into question the notion that al-Qaeda and 9/11 marked a ‘revolu-
tionary’ change in the nature of terrorism. In many respects, they
seem to constitute a ‘paradigm shift’ rather than a ‘quantum leap’ —
more evolutionary than revolutionary. 
There are plenty of factors that suggest 9/11 was a ‘world-
changing event’: the launching of a “Global War on Terrorism”; the
consequent invasions and occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan; the
rise of major insurgencies in both countries; radicalization of expa-
triate Muslim communities; the fracturing of the trans-Atlantic
alliance; the adoption of harsh anti-terrorism measures by liberal
democratic states; and finally, the American adoption of the strategy
of ‘preventive war.’ While it is tempting to suggest that none of this
would have happened without 9/11, the truth of the matter is less
clear-cut than one might think. Granted that five years is still much
too close to place an event in its proper historical context, the evi-
dence thus far suggests first that 9/11 may have been less earth-shak-
ing in its strategic consequences than first imagined and second that
reactions to it  contain some ‘genetic markers’ of longer-term trends
that pre-date that event. Its strategic significance will probably be
determined by three factors: the outcome of the war in Iraq; the
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extent to which ‘pre-emptive war’ becomes an accepted model of
international crisis management; and the ability of democracies to
balance security and civil liberties in the face of a prolonged war. At
this juncture, perhaps all that we can say with any certainty is that
history is a continuum and that 9/11 represents neither a beginning
nor an end.
INTRODUCTION
The United States has marked the seventh anniversary of the 9/11 attacks,
but the after-effects of that day continue to reverberate around the world. It is
probably much too soon to draw any definitive conclusions about its long-term
impact, let alone its place in history.1 But seven years is long enough to ask some
preliminary questions and suggest some tentative answers.
This article will address only two of the many possible questions. First, did
9/11 represent a “Revolution in Terrorism Affairs” (RTA)? That is, did it amount
to such a profound break with the past practice of terrorism that we now confront
an unprecedented threat? Second, did it “alter the course of history”? Did it ini-
tiate any significant events or have consequences that otherwise would not have
occurred? To answer the first question, the article will identify the key features
of the 9/11 attacks and the organization that initiated them and then compare
these to the actions and attributes of earlier groups.  The second question will be
addressed by looking for continuities and discontinuities in policies and actions
undertaken by the international community after 9/11.
9/11: Revolution or Evolution?
The basic facts of 9/11 are not in dispute, except among the most strident
of conspiracy buffs.2 On 11 September 2001, 19 men recruited and trained by the
al-Qaeda movement based in Afghanistan hijacked four American airliners on
domestic flights. They crashed two of them into the World Trade Center in New
York, one into the Pentagon in Washington, and one into a field in Pennsylvania
— the latter apparently the result of a struggle with passengers who attempted to
retake control of the aircraft. Nearly 3,000 people died in the attacks and hun-
dreds more were injured.3 In addition to the human toll, the attack inflicted huge
financial losses.4 Beyond those basic matters, of course, the field is wide open to
interpretation and re-interpretation. Given the magnitude and drama of the event,
the many loose ends and unanswered questions, and the political aftermath in the
United States and overseas, the controversy over 9/11 — like the Kennedy assas-
sination — is likely to invite extended historical and journalistic debate.
At a cursory glance, it is easy to argue that 9/11 and al-Qaeda together rep-
resent a ‘revolutionary’ change in terrorism, implying a fundamental break with
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the past, turning previous experience on its head. Qualitatively and quantitative-
ly they appear to be quite different in organization and capacity from the more
‘conventional’ terrorist groups that were active from the 1970s to the 1990s. The
most persistent groups of that era, such as the IRA (Irish Republican Army), ETA
(Euskadi Ta Askatasuna), and the various Palestinian groups, were nationalist
movements whose goals were limited to ‘liberating’ specific lands and peoples.
They usually comprised only a few hundred members. The ideologically moti-
vated groups at that time, such as the leftist Red Army Faction, were even small-
er because their radical beliefs appealed to only a very limited constituency.
Generally speaking, nationalist groups limited their attacks to the ‘homeland.’
Palestinian groups were almost unique in their heavy reliance on ‘international’
operations, brought on by their ‘stateless’ refugee origins and the difficulty of
attacking Israel. Since terrorists drew their support from a clearly defined and
often small pool of sympathisers at home and abroad, and because state spon-
sorship was provided covertly and rarely on a lavish scale, most groups had lim-
ited funds for operations and related activities. State sponsors also imposed some
constraints on capabilities and operations to limit their own liability. Thus, such
groups were rarely innovative in their choice of weapons, tactics, and targets, and
their capacity for mayhem was relatively constrained. Indeed, until the 1980s,
mass casualty attacks were rare.5
With this in mind, thirty years ago Rand Corporation analyst Brian Jenkins
articulated what became the conventional wisdom about international terrorism;
that “Terrorists want a lot of people watching . . . not a lot of people dead.”6 The
aim was to publicize a cause (for example, the Palestinians) and to mobilize sup-
porters for it. So, groups that carried out attacks claimed responsibility for them
in very public ways, during or immediately after the attack: on radio, TV, through
communiqués, and spokespersons. Casualties and fatalities generally were low,
as few as one or two, at most a few dozen. Hostages usually were released. To
do otherwise could alienate potential supporters, de-legitimize the cause, or pro-
voke severe counter-measures that might destroy the group.7
But since the 1980s, many terrorist incidents have gone unclaimed. This
suggests a change in motivation: from mobilization to ‘punishment.’The primary
motive no longer seems to be to compel states to meet the terrorists’ demands,
but rather to deliver major damaging physical and psychological blows against
the terrorists’ enemies, to punish them for being wrong. In effect, al-Qaeda
changed the nature of strategic conflict; the contested ground is no longer terri-
tory but values. The result of this has been a much higher level of casualties. And
while mass casualties are not new in terrorism, 9/11 took lethality to a whole new
level. The audience is still important, but the communication process has
changed. Michael Dartnell argues that 9/11 demonstrated the new power and
skills that information technology (IT) has given to non-state actors, such as ter-
rorists. Terrorism is all about sending messages, and in a web-based world, visu-
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al images reshape values inherent in messages. On 9/11, al-Qaeda shifted the
message of political discourse from state-based, ‘management’ values to the
apocalyptic ones of the non-state.8 This represents a new form of ‘Propaganda of
the Deed’ in the post-McLuhan IT age; the medium (the attack) is the message.
So, now we have “a lot of people watching and a lot of people dead.”9
Al-Qaeda is said to epitomize this so-called ‘New Terrorism.’10 First, its
goals, beliefs, and practices define it as a trans-national revolutionary movement.
Al-Qaeda and its affiliates expound an ideology of jihadism, which “is not a reli-
gion but an ideology based on religious elements. . . .”11 It could be described as
a program of radical social change in the Muslim world. It displays a coherent
set of beliefs and behaviours, which have grafted twentieth-century European
concepts of revolutionary political struggle onto selected Islamic doctrines
appropriated from the Salafist and Wahhabist traditions, and which together give
pride of place to jihad — an armed struggle to restore God’s rule on Earth.12 It
gives its adherents a reductionist, Manichean (‘we vs. they’) world view and a
motivation that explains and justifies all. 
This is married to a messianic vision: to restore the Muslim Caliphate, thus
returning all past and present Muslim lands to rule by Sharia law. Drawing upon
both medieval and modern theorists bin Laden claims that his campaign against
the US and its allies is a jihad — an armed struggle in defense of Islam, which
is an individual obligation upon all Muslims. The modern theorists whose writ-
ings inform jihadism include Maulana abul Ala Maududi, Islamic thinker and
founder of the Jamiat-i-Islami, the  most powerful Islamist party in Pakistan;
Hassan al-Banna, founder of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood; and Sayid Qutb, the
Brotherhood’s ideologist, who expanded upon and radicalized the ideas of the
first two and left a legacy of revolutionary writing. They, in turn, had been
inspired in part by the thirteenth-century jurist Ibn Taymiyyah, who argued that
jihad was justified to overthrow apostate rulers who did not govern according to
the Sharia: Islamic law. His modern interpreters saw Islam and jihad in this con-
text as forces for revolutionary change, intended to restore Muslim societies to
the original precepts and practices of Islam as articulated by God to Mohammed,
by cleansing modern Islam of alien and corrupting influences, and of apostate
rulers and their foreign allies.13
In the name of that ideology, al-Qaeda carried out the single most costly
terrorist attack in history. The largest death toll from a single terrorist attack prior
to 9/11 was 329 — the total number of victims of the Air India bombing in
1985.14 The twin embassy bombings in East Africa in 1998 caused a higher over-
all casualty toll but a much smaller number of fatalities and a minimal econom-
ic impact.15 The human and financial scale of the 9/11 attack seems to place it in
a league by itself. It started a war that has already toppled two regimes and indi-
rectly claimed another. It inflicted catastrophic human, psychological, political,
and economic damage, with major ripple effects on global security and stability.
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In fact, bin Laden probably hoped to provoke a war between the West and Islam:
a final ‘Clash of Civilizations.’ Jihadists see the war in Iraq as a major part of
that apocalyptic clash.16 No terrorist group in history has had that kind of impact.
Second, al-Qaeda seems to display some of the features of an apocalyptic
cult, not unlike the Aum Shin Rikyo, which carried out the 1995 nerve gas attack
in Tokyo. In fact, it has become common to describe al-Qaeda as a ‘movement’
or even as a source of inspiration rather than as a centrally directed group or
organization.17 Its cult-like features include charismatic leadership. Osama bin
Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, in particular, seem to have created a ‘cult of per-
sonality’ among their followers, some of whom swear personal oaths of alle-
giance (bayat) to the leaders.18 Although he has no clerical training, bin Laden
has appropriated some of the iconography of an Islamic scholar. To legitimize
their own efforts, al-Qaeda’s leaders invoke the central role of the Prophet in
founding and propagating Islam. Constant reference to the example and actions
of Mohammed provides a precedent for and a model of strong leadership. In an
al-Qaeda recruitment video produced in 2000, bin Laden exhorted Muslim
believers to follow the example of Mohammed and his companions to join the
jihad.19 In his key work, Join the Caravan, bin Laden’s ideological mentor
Abd’Allah Azzam asserted that:
Jihad is a collective act of worship, and every group must have a
leader. Obedience to the leader is a necessity in jihad, and thus a per-
son must condition himself invariably [to] obey the leader, as has
been reported in the hadith. . . .20
Rohan Gunaratna describes bin Laden as “the model Islamist, the pre-eminent
leader of the pioneering vanguard” who possesses “charismatic and authoritari-
an leadership, depends upon a disciplined inner core of adherents, and promotes
a rigorous socio-moral code for all followers.”21
Third, the trans-national appeal of al-Qaeda’s ideology has allowed it to
attract to its war three unique pools of recruits. Initially, it based the organization
on international veterans of the Afghan war who could not return to their native
countries because their militancy and combat experience would be seen as a
threat to their home regimes. Later, it used religious leaders, mosques, and reli-
gious schools to recruit and indoctrinate new members, who were then sent to
Afghan camps for paramilitary training by the veterans. More recently, especial-
ly since the fall of al-Qaeda’s ‘host’ — the Taliban regime in Afghanistan — it
has increasingly relied on a ‘leaderless resistance’ of ‘home-grown’ terrorists,
largely self-recruited and even self-taught via jihadist sites on the Internet. This
combination of recruitment and training methods produced a global pool of
fanatically motivated and skilled ‘Soldiers of God’ who were willing to sacrifice
themselves for the jihadist cause to fulfill bin Laden’s vision.22 Borderless
recruitment permits a trans-national insurgency; the front truly is everywhere.
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Fourth, al-Qaeda represents the ‘privatization’ of war and terrorism. Like
a character from a James Bond novel, Osama bin Laden — a private citizen —
has launched his own war. He created a global fund-raising network of charities
and private sources that generated money to support his insurgency. While in
Sudan, bin Laden used his businesses as fronts to acquire and deploy weapons,
explosives, and other military technologies. In its ‘corporate’ guise, al-Qaeda
eschewed the traditional hierarchical pyramid organization common to most ter-
rorist groups in favour of the ‘flat,’ de-centralized, IT-driven, ‘hub-and-wheel’
structure. Until the US-led coalition deprived it of a firm base in Afghanistan, al-
Qaeda functioned as a kind of holding company with ‘branch offices’ and ‘fran-
chisees’ world-wide. Its small central headquarters engaged in long-term strate-
gic planning, using ‘management by objective’ and ‘directive control’ to run a
series of terrorist ‘franchises’ in many countries. They shared a common ‘mis-
sion statement,’ but the individual franchisees were encouraged to use their ini-
tiative to develop a ‘product’ (attacks) best suited to the local ‘market’ (targets).
They then submitted their plans to ‘head office’; if it approved, then it subsidized
the operation — up to a point (its funding was never lavish). As such, al-Qaeda
is a creature of the post-modern world. Its war depends heavily on the tools of
globalization: open borders, international transportation, ATMs, cell phones, fax
machines, and the Internet. It invests money and moves it globally. The
‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ is often described as a ‘system of systems’; al-
Qaeda is a virtual ‘network of networks,’ with the connectivity provided by the
intertwined fibres of ideology and technology. The strategic factors driving
jihadist terrorism, globalization, and IT embodying modernity, and jihadist ide-
ology challenging it, had emerged earlier in an evolutionary, synergistic, and
non-linear fashion. But they converged on 9/11 in an apparently revolutionary
way. In al-Qaeda, they find symbiosis and synergy, a grandiose vision married
to a strategic capability that allows the movement to ‘Think Globally, and Act
Locally.’ In this respect, al-Qaeda could be called “Terrorism.com.”23
Since the fall of the Taliban in November 2001, it has become common-
place to assert that al-Qaeda’s regional affiliates have had to operate with less
central direction. As a result, it has become a decentralized, trans-national, post-
modern organization, whose very nature has made it difficult to find and defeat.
In fact, this argument runs, there probably is no longer a single al-Qaeda organ-
ization. Rather, it has mutated into a ‘constellation’ of regionally distributed,
like-minded groups who now collectively make up a global jihadist insurgent
movement.24 However, Bruce Hoffman, formerly Rand’s leading expert on al-
Qaeda, challenges this perspective. He argues that evidence from the attacks in
Spain and Britain indicates that al-Qaeda still has a functioning leadership and
structure that directs the armed struggle, including the activities of the so-called
‘home-grown’ terrorists. It is also actively engaged in information warfare over
the Internet to recruit new jihadists, and influence the views of existing and
potential sympathisers.25
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Thus, it is not difficult to see al-Qaeda as something sui generic and 9/11
as an unprecedented terrorist act. If nothing else, in scale and in their reliance on
modern technology, they seem to be a phenomena peculiar to our age. 
But does all this amount to a ‘Revolution in Terrorism Affairs’? While 9/11
and al-Qaeda have demonstrated new capabilities, there is much about them that
seems familiar. David Rapoport argues that al-Qaeda can be seen as part of an
evolving historical terrorist continuum. It was not the first but simply the most
prominent group in the fourth (religious) ‘wave’ of terrorism that began in the
1970s.26 Likewise, Stephen Sloan reminds us that terrorists first went ‘global’ in
the 1970s as a result of two earlier social ‘revolutions’ in transportation and
communications. Air travel gave them strategic ‘reach’ and a physical ‘soft tar-
get,’ while television provided them with a means to reach a global mass audi-
ence. For example, terrorist hijackings of airliners, which is also a way of using
an airliner as a weapon, dates back at least to 1968. In fact, it was the PFLP
(Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) — not al-Qaeda — that carried
out the first coordinated, simultaneous, multiple terrorist attacks: the hijacking of
four airliners in 1970. And many of the early terrorist attacks attracted extensive
media coverage; the Munich Olympics attack in 1972, the seizure of the
American hostages in Iran in 1979, and the hijacking of TWA 837 in 1985 are
cases in point. 9/11 was not the first mass casualty attack; the trend toward
increasing the human cost of terrorism began during the 1980s. Nor was it unusu-
al for the US to be attacked by groups emanating from the Middle East; such
attacks can be traced back to the early 1970s. Islamist groups first began attack-
ing the US in Beirut in 1983, and they carried out their first significant attack on
the US mainland eight years before 9/11, with the first World Trade Center attack
in 1993.27 Contrary to conventional wisdom, al-Qaeda was not a wholly inde-
pendent actor; both Sudan and Afghanistan provided sanctuary and facilities. So,
it was state-sponsored, as many terrorist organizations have been.28 Jihadism
also seems to display many of the beliefs and practices that were common to
twentieth-century fascist movements: extreme nationalism, authoritarianism,
millenarianism, anti-Semitism, a romanticised view of the past and consequent
desire for cultural purification, a nihilist rejection of reason, and a retreat from
rationality into mysticism. Its charismatic leaders use oaths of allegiance and
militarized rhetoric that emphasize the collective over the individual, glorify vio-
lence, de-humanize the enemy, and encourage a will to action.29
So, the development of terrorism over the last three decades calls into
question the notion that al-Qaeda and 9/11 marked an RTA. In many respects,
they seem to constitute a ‘paradigm shift’ rather than a ‘quantum leap’ — more
evolutionary than revolutionary. 
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9/11: A ‘Hinge-Point’ of History?
In its first issue after the attacks, The Economist magazine described 9/11
as “The Day the World Changed.”30 But if al-Qaeda and 9/11 represent more of
an evolution than a revolution in terrorism, then it is legitimate to question the
proposition that they changed the world. Have they, in fact, acted as ‘drivers of
history’?
It is easy to understand why 9/11 could be seen as a new point of histori-
cal departure. First, it was in response to those attacks that the United States and
its allies launched a ‘Global War on Terrorism’ (GWOT). While aimed at
destroying al-Qaeda, a goal which it has not yet achieved,31 the GWOT also pro-
vided a convenient cover for a larger American agenda. Under the guise of that
war, American-led coalitions invaded Afghanistan and Iraq and toppled their dic-
tatorial regimes, both believed to have been linked to terrorism.32 In each case,
democratic successor governments have been installed and legitimized by inter-
nationally validated elections. If these governments survive — a matter of some
uncertainty — they would represent a significant change in the Middle East.
However, the second impact is less positive. In both cases this bold exper-
iment has stalled. The nascent democracy in Afghanistan has made considerable
progress since 2001 but suffers from many ‘growing pains,’ such as corruption,
lack of infrastructure, a narcotics-based black economy, and a resurgent Taliban
insurgency. It remains in dire need of long-term commitment of military, politi-
cal, and economic support from an international community that seems to have
lost its enthusiasm for ensuring that nation-building succeeds in the face of vio-
lence. The future of Afghanistan remains uncertain.33
In Iraq, the situation is much worse. There the United States has become
mired in a prolonged and bloody insurgency that has imposed large human,
financial, and political costs on the US, and much more severe costs on the
Iraqis. The democratization effort in Iraq has been frustrated by factional fight-
ing that could end with a civil war and the fracturing of Iraq into multiple mini-
states, along the lines of former Yugoslavia. While there have been significant
improvements in the security situation over the last year, support for the war in
Iraq has waned in the US, and the Bush administration and its likely successors
are now actively seeking a way out.34 So, for the first time in 30 years, the United
States faces the possibility of defeat in war. Should it occur, that defeat would
have severe ramifications for the US, the Middle East, and global security.
Third, the impact of 9/11 — and the American response to it — extends
well beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. The Iraq war and insurgency revived and
emboldened the jihadist movement, which was ‘on the ropes’ after being driven
from Afghanistan. On the one hand, undetermined numbers of foreign jihadists
have joined the insurgency inside Iraq and helped to polarize the ethno-cultural
conflict there. On the other, jihadism has taken root among the large Muslim
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minorities in Europe. Only a tiny, albeit active, proportion of them sympathize
with the jihadists, but many more oppose the Iraq war and GWOT, which they
see as campaigns against Islam. In response, ‘home grown’ and expatriate
jihadist terrorists have carried out mass casualty attacks in Britain and Spain,
where these incidents influenced the outcome of a national election that ousted
the pro-American government, and its successor withdrew Spanish forces from
Iraq.35 That was a significant blow to the unity and legitimacy of the American
coalition. Elsewhere, Muslim youths rioted in the Paris suburbs for several
weeks in 2005, and the violence in those areas has continued at a lower level
since.36 And a radical Islamist assassinated a provocative film-maker in the
Netherlands.37 While galvanised more by local conditions than by global geopol-
itics, these events in France and Holland nonetheless speak to the fact that since
9/11 a festering and potentially bitter divide has come to threaten the internal
cohesion, harmony, and security of European societies.38
Fourth, after a brief period of solidarity in the immediate aftermath of the
9/11 attacks, the US and Europe had an angry falling out over Iraq. Most west-
ern European nations, France and Germany in particular, opposed the war. In
forcing the issue, the Bush administration squandered much of the goodwill it
had reaped on 9/11; both sides ‘burned their bridges’ in fits of nasty diplomacy,
and relations between Europe and the US have remained cool since. As a result,
they have become at best reluctant partners in other American-led endeavours,
including the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan. Even America’s
relationship with its closest ally — Great Britain — is strained. Participation in
the war in Iraq is unpopular in Britain and then-Prime Minister Tony Blair,
President Bush’s most loyal supporter at the start of that war, was forced to step
down, having lost considerable credibility once the pretext for the war — the
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat — was  shown to be false. It may be
fair to say that Europe and America have not been so far apart in half a century
and this is likely to have negative ramifications for other security cooperation
issues, as well as on issues outside that field.39
Fifth, 9/11 led many Western democracies to adopt new anti-terrorism
measures that extend the powers of police and security services. Preventive
detention and wider internal surveillance powers may improve security against
terrorism, but they have done so at the cost of some degree of privacy and free-
dom. The US established a network of secret detention centers for terrorist sus-
pects outside the jurisdiction of American and even host country laws, and loos-
ened the strictures against torture of those suspects. It has also attempted to cir-
cumvent the American legal system by proposing to try terror suspects before
military tribunals and execute them if they are found guilty.40 Other nations have
gone further and imposed new standards on their Muslim populations. The
French government banned the wearing of headscarves in schools and even the
normally tolerant Netherlands moved to ban wearing the burqa.41 Thus, it could
be argued that 9/11 caused these democracies to become less democratic. 
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Finally, in response to 9/11 the US government adopted a strategy of ‘pre-
ventive war.’ It was applied first to justify the war against Iraq, on the grounds
that Hussein’s regime was suspected of harbouring weapons of mass destruction
that could be given to terrorists, who might use them against the US.42 This pol-
icy does represent a significant departure from past practice and one with poten-
tially serious long-term consequences. Certainly, the strategic calculus that
underlines pre-emptive war — the need to act first against an enemy suspected
of plotting to strike — could be applied by many states. It could be used to jus-
tify an Israeli strike on Iran, a Pakistani assault on India, or perhaps even a North
Korean attack on the US itself. By adopting and then applying this policy the US
may have established a precedent it might come to regret.
Would any of this have happened without 9/11? The preliminary answer is
less clear-cut than one might think. The GWOT was not America’s first ‘war on
terrorism’; journalists used that phrase to describe the US campaign against ter-
rorism in the 1980s, although the Reagan administration did not.43 The US-led
war that toppled the Taliban regime was really a continuation of the power strug-
gle in Afghanistan whose origins pre-date the Soviet invasion of 1979 and in
which the US had played a role in the 1980s.44 And the US had been engaged in
a prolonged military campaign against Iraq since 1990.45 Furthermore, the US
has a long history of intervening to ‘remake’ smaller states. So, in that sense the
Iraq invasion fits a historical pattern. Nor was the dispute over Iraq the first or
only clash between the US and Europe over major international issues, and it will
not be the last. Since the end of the Cold War, Europe has increasingly tried to
assert its own role in world affairs distinct from that of the US. It may be fair to
suggest that 9/11 and the war in (and over) Iraq did nothing more than simply
accelerate  tendencies that were already at work in trans-Atlantic relations.46
Furthermore, the post-9/11 ‘obsession’ with ‘homeland security’ is hardly
new. And experience suggests that this is not an irreversible trend. During the
Second World War the Allied democracies adopted internal security measures far
more stringent than those applied since 9/11. Most of those practices were shed
quickly at the end of the war, and although some lingered through the Cold War,
it is fair to suggest that the Western liberal democracies emerged from both those
periods as substantially ‘freer’ societies. In short, counter-terrorism security is
not a one-way, permanent, dead end street.
And what of “the dog that didn’t bark”? While the GWOT, war in Iraq, and
(to a lesser extent) that in Afghanistan have done little to improve relations
between the West and Muslim world, the much-vaunted ‘Clash of Civilisations’
has not yet reached the apocalyptic proportions that some have feared and that
perhaps bin Laden had hoped to achieve. That is not to say that the situation
could not deteriorate, especially in Europe; only that we are not there yet, and the
present course is not irreversible. The issues that engaged and enraged bin Laden
are ‘Arab-centric’; they do not necessarily resonate strongly with the vast major-
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ity of Muslims who live outside the Middle East. That, in turn, probably explains
why the jihadists remain a fringe rather than mainstream Islamic movement. 
Furthermore, focusing on the Western versus Muslim aspects of this con-
flict may blind us to a more significant dispute: the struggle for the ‘soul’ of
Islam, especially over who will define the future shape of Islam and how it will
relate to the non-Islamic world. Al-Qaeda represents only one of the contending
factions. It may be new to the West, but within Muslim history such a group is a
recurring phenomenon. Like Christianity, Islam has been shaken periodically by
‘reformist’ movements and tendencies that aimed to restore the faith to its origi-
nal precepts and practices. The Wahhabist movement, which emerged in the
eighteenth century and provided the theo-ideological foundation for the al-Saud
dynasty in contemporary Saudi Arabia, is a case in point. The same could be said
of the Salafists of the nineteenth century, and the original Muslim Brotherhood
of the twentieth. The result, some would argue, is a kind of civil war, not unlike
the Christian Reformation and Counter-Reformation. In that context, 9/11 was
one ‘battle’ in a much larger and longer conflict. It did not begin with al-Qaeda
or 9/11, and will not end with them.47
Granted that seven years is still much too close to place an event in its
proper historical context, but the evidence thus far suggests first, that 9/11 may
have been less earth-shattering in its strategic consequences than initially imag-
ined, and second, that reactions to it contain some ‘genetic markers’ of longer-
term trends that pre-date that event. Its strategic significance will probably be
determined by three factors: the outcome of the war in Iraq; the extent to which
‘pre-emptive war’ becomes an accepted model of international crisis manage-
ment; and the ability of democracies to balance security and civil liberties in the
face of a prolonged war. At this juncture, perhaps all that we can say with any
certainty is that history is a continuum and 9/11 represents neither a beginning
nor an end.
David A. Charters is Professor of History at the University of New Brunswick.
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